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This paper examines  the  impact of  deficit  reductions  on agricultural
price support  spending, and proposes several  policy  innovations  designed
to remove agricultural  programs from the entitlement category.  First,
agricultural program  costs are  analyzed in  relation  to deficit  reduction
requirements resulting from recent  legislation.  Second,  price support  and
food stamp  programs are proposed  as  a separate budget  category  to be
financed through an excise  tax on retail food sales.  Third,  the incidence
of  this  tax on consumers  is  considered, and compensation for lower income
groups  is  proposed via expanded eligibility for the  food stamp program.
A final section presents  some conclusion for policy.-2-
Introduction
Agricultural income  is  supported  by  federal farm income programs  as  an
entitlement.  Like other entitlement  programs such  as Medicare,  Medicaid,
and Social Security, the government  agrees  to  pay  the  cost  of  income  support
to eligible recipients  out of  general  tax revenues.  Together, Medicare,
Medicaid, Social  Security and  farm price supports  have  risen from $20  billion
in 1965  to $300  billion in  1985.  Total entitlements have  amounted to  as
much as 42 percent  of the  federal budget  in  recent years.  Because  these
payments  fluctuate with general economic conditions,  and have grown rapidly,
they are an unpredictable  and substantial contribution  to  the  federal budget
deficit.  It is now widely recognized  that these  entitlements  (together with
defense spending) cannot grow at  current  rates without putting continued
upward pressure on federal  budget deficits.  Either taxes  must  be  raised or
spending must be cut deeply across  entitlement  categories and defense  if
budget deficits are  to be  brought under  control.
In  agriculture, the exact  mechanisms  are  complicated,  but  the principle
of  entitlement is  simple:  farmers'  incomes  are supported  to  grow crops  in a
way  that  increases with the  acres of crops  grown.  Thus, agricultural
entitlements  increase as  the production unit  increases  in  size (Cochrane,
1985).  In this way, farmers' incomes  are supported if  they  agree  to  conform
to  the guidelines of  the  support programs,  which specify how much acreage
and what crops are eligible  for  payment and how much  farmers will  be  paid  by
crop  and per acre in the coming marketing year.  While farmers obviously
have gained from this arrangement  (with the  largest farms  gaining most),
consumers have also gained substantially  through  lower  food prices.-3-
In  recent years, the  cost  of  supporting farm income  has  risen dramati-
cally as  increased production and stagnant demand have  created unprecedented
domestic and  international surpluses.  These surpluses  have put strong down-
ward pressure on agricultural  prices and incomes.  In  an attempt to maintain
farm incomes,  the  1985  farm bill (the Food Security Act)  freezes  target
income  support levels  for two  years.  At  the  same  time,  it  lowers  minimum
support prices  in an effort to create a vent  for U.S.  farm surpluses  in
world markets.  The result,  to  be  explained  in more detail below, is  a huge
budget exposure - primarily because  farmers  are entitled  to  the difference
between the frozen target  price  level  and the  minimum price - a gap which
has  widened dramatically  as  minimum (and market)  prices  have fallen.  The
resulting transfer, or "deficiency payment,"  can be $50,000  per farmer and
in some  cases  more.  These payments, together with food stamps, are  the  two
largest  components  of agricultural program spending, accounting for an
average of  64.36  percent of  the USDA budget from 1973-1986.
This paper considers how agricultural spending, as  an important  part of
the entitlement budget  category, can be  refinanced.  Its  premise  is  that
what one  pays for agricultural programs cannot  be separated from how one
pays  for them.  Three linkages from  the  targets  of  policy  to  the  instruments
of  reform will be examined.  The policy targets  are  (1) budget  exposure  in
agricultural program spending;  (2) income instability in  the  agricultural
sector;  and  (3)  hunger and inadequate  nutrition.  The  instruments  proposed
to deal with them are (1)  a separate  budget for agricultural  programs,  based
on a fixed level of  income support;  (2) payment  of  direct income  transfers
to  farmers  financed through an excise  tax on retail food sales;  (3)  expan-
sion of  federal food stamp  programs  to  compensate poor consumers  for  losses-4-
suffered from such an excise  tax.  The consequences  of  such reforms,  it is
argued, would be (1) reduced  budget  exposure;  (2)  a direct  financial linkage
from farmers  to the consumers  they ultimately serve;  and  (3) direct atten-
tion to  the problem of  hunger and inadequate  nutrition.
Policy Targets
(1)  Budget Exposure in Agricultural Program Spending
How much will the Food Security Act  of  1985 cost?  Nobody knows  for
sure, and no one will know until  the government  deficiency payment  checks  to
farmers are actually  issued.  Virtually  all observers agree  that  $52  billion
over three years, the Congress' original cost  estimate, is  low.  Current
estimates range  as high as  $75  billion, suggesting Congressional prediction
error of just under 50%.
Why are farm program  costs so unpredictable?  Each year, USDA impleT
ments  the price and income  support programs  decided on  by Congress.  In  crop
year 1984-85,  for example,  the  basic program for corn was  set  by  the  1984
provisions of  the four-year  1981  farm bill.  The  "target"  price was  set  at
$3.03, indicating how much  Congress felt  farmers  "ought" to  be  paid per
bushel of  corn.  The "loan  rate,"  which sets  a floor or  minimum price  for
Corn,  was  set  at  $2.55.1  Together, these prices  determine  the minimum and
maximum prices available  to  corn producers, assuming the  market  price falls
somewhere  in-between (see Figure  1).  If the  market  price  is  less  than  the
loan, the loan rate  is  the  effective minimum price.  The  total payment to
The loan rate sets a minimum price  because it  is the  price at which the
Commodity Credit  Corporation (CCC) extends  credit  to  farmers producing corn and  other crops.  If the  market  price  falls below the  loan rate,  the  farmer
can  surrender his crop  to  the CCC  in  lieu of  paying back  the  loan.  This "non-recource"  provision makes  the  loan  rate  an effective minimum price.Target  Price 
deficiency
payment 
Market Price  / 
(average)
Loan Rate
eligible acres  ---
acreage
reductions
total  "base"  acreage
Figure  1:  The  Price-Income
Support  Mechanism-5-
the farmer is  the difference between  the target  price and  the  market price
(or loan rate) multiplied times  yield on eligible  "base" acreage  after
accounting for official acreage  reductions or retirements. 2 When the market
price  falls, deficiency payments  rise, all other things  equal.  As  falling
market prices approach the  loan rate, many  farmers  surrender  their crops  to
the government  in lieu of  repayment  of  government  crop loans,  and  surpluses
are stored at federal expense.
Frozen target  prices,  together with authority granted to the
Agriculture Secretary to dramatically  lower loan rates,  are  the  primary
feature of  the  new 1985 farm legislation.  While  corn target  prices  remained
frozen at  $3.03 per bushel until  1987-88,  loan rates  fell to  1.92  in
1986-87, and can fall again to 1.81  in  1987-88.  At  the  same time, a huge
glut of  commodities has pushed market  prices  down near  the  loan, raising
deficiency payments to  record levels  as  fewer and fewer  farmers see any
alternative to market their  crops  to anyone  but  the  government.
While a theoretical cap  of  $50,000  per  farm on  deficiency  payments
exists,  the  lowered loans  ordered by  the Secretary of Agriculture allow  this
cap  to  be exceeded, and  in practice many individual  farmers will  find devices
to become  more than a single  farm at  a time,  collecting multiple deficiency
payments.  The  result  is  that government  deficiency  payments  are  expected  to
The  primary mechanism by  which acreage  is  reduced  is the  "set-aside,"  in which eligibility for price  and income  support  is made  conditional on retiring a certain percentage of  base acreage  from production  in the  covered commodities.  However,  the government  may also pay  outright  for  such reduc- tions.  These  "paid diversions,"  together with special programs  such  as  the conservation reserve,"  result  in  additional direct  transfers  to  farmers  in return for agreements  not  to grow on  certain areas  of  land.  Base  acreage and yields per acre are calculated  on  the  basis  of  individual farm  records and county averages over the  last  3-5  years.-6-
make up a greater and greater share of  farm income.  Recent  estimates  by my
colleagues at  the University of Minnesota (Bailey,  Byron and Houck,  1986),
based on a computer forecasting model, project  that government  payments will
account for 45.5  percent  of  U.S.  net  farm income  in  1986,  63.4  percent  in
1987,  and 77.3  percent  in  1988  (Table  1).  U.S.  farmers,  in  other words,
will become largely wards  of  the state over  the next  three  years. Yet  as
critics  of  the programs  have emphasized, a $50,000 entitlement  is hardly
welfare.  As agricultural program costs grow, together with budget deficits,
urban members  of Congress are  increasingly  restive about paying them.
If  cost figures for  agricultural programs were predictable, their
contribution to federal deficits  could at  least  be  anticipated in advance.
Unfortunately, they are  notoriously difficult to  forecast.  The  difference
between estimated and actual expenditures  for farm price supports  is  shown
in Figure 2 for  the years  1973  to  1986.  As  is  clear,  inaccurate predictions
account for disparities of  billions  of  dollars  in a given year.  Since  the
deficiency payment  to which farmers are entitled  fluctuates with market  prices
and with the number of  farmers who sign up  for  the  programs  in a given
year, these  payments can only be  predicted under  current programs if market
prices  (andsthus farm gross revenues)  remain  relatively  stable.  Even with
market prices  at or below loan levels,  total government  obligations  are
simply  unknown until full  sign-up  figures become  available.  Unfortunately,
low market prices and heavy  sign-ups (the  current situation) are  the  most
budget-busting combination of  all.
Ironically,  a final source of  budget uncertainty is  Congress'  home  cure
for  budget irresponsibility:  the Graham-Rudman-Hollings  (GRH) deficitTable  1
Policy  Projections  of  Farm  Income  and  Government
Payments  Under  the  Food  Security  Act  of  1985
Variable/Year  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Billions  of  Dollars Cash  Receipts  From
Marketings
Crops  69.5  69.9  63.6  55.1  54.4  54.7 Livestock  72.7  68.7  68.6  65.6  64.3  65.3
Direct  Government
Payments  and Subsidies  8.0  8.0  10.7  14.2  15.0  14.4
Total Farm Cash
Receipts  153.2  149.6  145.9  138.0  136.7  137.5
Net Farm Income  34.5  25.7  23.5  22.4  19.4  20.1
Direct Government
Payments and  Subsidies
as a Percentge  of
Net Farm Income  23.2-%  31.1%  45.5%  63.4%  77.3X  71.6X
Source:  Bailey, Byron and Houck,  1986.
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reduction plan.  GRH  sets maximum allowable  federal deficits  through  1991,
and mandates automatic across-the-board cuts  in about  half the  federal
budget  in any year if Congress  and  the president  cannot meet predetermined
deficit reduction targets.  Half  of  the  cuts  are  to  come from defense, and
half from the remaining portion  of  the  budget.  However, major parts  of  the
budget  including food stamps,  Social Security, Medicaid, and large  parts of
Medicare are ineligible  for cuts.  This  leaves agricultural price  supports
especially  exposed.  Exactly how exposed depends on whether the  automatic
percentage cuts go into effect, or whether selective cuts  are made  based on
Congressional  and presidential  agreement.  In either case,  the deficiency
payments made  to farmers  in each year will be  reduced,  but  the  exact percen-
tage reduction from year to year remains unknown.  Moreover, since  the  total
deficiency payments made  to farmers  are  themselves unpredictable  from year
to year, the base against which percentage  cuts  will apply is  itself
unknown, compounding the problem  of estimating  agricultural deficit  reduc-
tions under GRH.  Even  if  GRH is  found unconstitutional  by  the Supreme
Court, budget pressures will make some  form of  cuts  in  entitlement  programs,
together with tax increases,  inevitable if  budget  deficits  are  to  be  reduced
substantially.
These budgetary difficulties have led  some  policy analysts  to  consider
taking agricultural support  programs  out  of  the  entitlement  category.  In
these  proposals,  farm programs would  be  allocated a fixed  amount  of  revenues
in a given year, with a binding budget  constraint.  Once the  budget  was
fixed in  this way, it would  be  up  to  the  Secretary of  Agriculture how to
spend it.  The primary difficulty  with  this  idea  is  that the  revenue demands
of  the  current system fluctuate too much  to allow budgets  to  be  accurately-8-
predicted.  Unless  an income  support mechanism can  be  found that  allows
revenue requirements to  be fixed in advance,  the unpredictable impact  of
agricultural program spending on federal budget  deficits will continue.
(2)  Income  Instability in  the Agricultural Sector
The evolution of  agricultural programs  is  closely related  to a fun-
damental characteristic of  farming:  risk and uncertainty arising from
instability in farm prices  and incomes.  This  instability has  increased  in
recent  years, as U.S.  farmers have been more  and more dependent on inter-
national markets.  In  a recent analysis  of  U.S.  corn market,  we found  that
the instability of  corn prices received  increased by  176.6  percent  in nomi-
nal terms  and 262.5  percent  in real  terms when measured as  the  variation
around trend from the  1960's  to  the early 1980's.  Gross revenues  to  farmers
from corn sales increased in variability by 214.0  percent  in nominal  terms
and 271.7 percent  in real terms  over  the same  period  (Myers  and  Runge,
1985).  These figures  are  shown in Table 2.  Further analysis  revealed that
demand side  factors (such as increasing reliance  of U.S.  corn producers on
export markets) played an increasingly  important  role  compared with supply
side factors (such as weather) in accounting for instability.
This instability has  created a rationale  for  government intervention  in
farm prices and incomes, although the actual impacts  on  farmer and  consumer
welfare require further study (see Myers,  1986).  It is  clear, however,  that
instability in farm prices  and incomes - and government  programs  to  offset
them - account  for substantial variations  in program costs  from year  to  year.
As  U.S.  agriculture has  become more  open to world  trade,  instability  in  farm
prices  and income has been transmitted to government  spending requirements
as  deficiency  payments rise and  fall  in  relation  to market  prices  and0
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program participation.  This situation has  also substantially complicated
the risk-management problem of  farmers.
In response to these  forces,  Kramer and McDowell  argue in a separate
paper in this session  that  the collective  risk faced  by  the  agricultural
sector creates a demand for assured net  farm income  to  the  sector  as  a
whole.  They propose a program of  income  transfers  to  farmers  not unlike
current  deficiency payments, but operating  through a scheme in which nega-
tive tax credits would be  issued to  producers  to  provide a guaranteed  income
floor.  If, as  they propose, this  floor were  set at  a sufficiently  low
level, it  would have a minimal impact  on market clearing prices  and would
serve many  of  the current  functions played  by loan rates.  In  contrast  to
loan rates,  however, such a policy would target farm income  rather  than farm
prices  as  the  relevant policy objective.  In  addition,  by fixing  the
guaranteed income level and thus  total budget  costs  in advance,  their plan
would allow more accurate predictions  of  total  budget exposure.
This  predictability could provide  a budget  for agricultural  support
programs  determined in  advance of program outlays.  Such a program would
force explicit choices about how much the government  (and public)  is willing
to  pay to  support farm incomes  through  transfer payments  to  farmers  (see
Gardner, 1981).  In essence,  the Kramer-McDowell proposal  offers  the minimum
payment  necessary to insure  farmers income  against losses  associated with
the downside risk of  instability in commodities  markets.  If  such a policy
were  implemented, a remaining problem would  be  to  find a revenue source  for
these payments  in the face  of  current budget constraints.  This problem is
addressed below.-10-
(3)  Hunger and Inadequate Nutrition
Although financial stress  in agriculture is  a subject  of  considerable
public interest, less  dramatic but equally  serious are growing problems of
hunger and inadequate nutrition in both rural and urban areas.  These
problems  are in turn linked  to the difficult  issue of  increasing poverty.
The argument cited above for a guaranteed minimum income in agriculture  is
thus part of a broader problem, and agricultural policy reforms  are  relevant
to broader  reforms  of the welfare system as a whole.  A key connection  be-
tween these efforts are  federal food stamp  and nutrition programs, which act
as  income supports for the  poor at  the same  time  that  they consume surplus
agricultural commodities.  Hopefully, current  efforts at  welfare  reform will
gain from the experience of  previous ones, notably  the  guaranteed  income
proposals developed by  the Moyniham Commission during  the Nixon administra-
tion,  in which direct  income transfers were  the centerpiece  of  the  program
(Moynihan, 1973).
These reforms  are  important both to agriculture and  to  consumers of
food.  In a 1985 Harvard School of  Public Health  report,  a Physician Task
Force argued that  hunger and inadequate nutrition  are increasingly serious
public health problems, stemming largely from government's  failure  to  pro-
vide an adequate minimum income standard.
In comparison to other industrialized nations  of  the world, we
do not provide an adequate margin of  safety and security.
Examination of a variety of  indices,  from preventive health
care to  hospital coverage, from food assistance  programs
to income supports, reveal  that  economically vulnerable people
in the United States do  not  have  the  protection provided  by
many nations which have fewer resources  than our own  (Physician
Task Force,  1985,  p. 87).
An important  element in  this  "margin of  safety"  is the  food stamp
program of  the U.S. Department  of Agriculture  (USDA).  Unfortunately, food-11-
stamps  are not granted  to  poor families  on  the  basis  of what  it actually
costs  to eat,  but  on the basis  of  a 1975  "thrifty food plan" devised by
USDA.  Benefits are tied to household  size, and are  the same  from state  to
state, based on the "thrifty food plan."  In  1985,  benefits averaged $44.00
per recipient  per month, or 490 per meal.  USDA's National Food Consumption
Survey indicates that over 80  percent of  all households whose food  expen-
ditures equal the thrifty  food plan  level fail to obtain the recommended
daily allowances  for nutrients  (Physician Task Force,  1985,  p. 98).
One important factor lowering the  real purchasing power of  food stamp
recipients  is  the impact of  state  sales  taxes  on food purchases.  Food  is  a
wage good, and a higher percentage of wage income  is  spent  on it  by  the
poor than the rich.  Hence,  food sales  taxes fall regressively  on those with
the highest proportion of  their  incomes devoted  to  food purchases.  In  1985,
the  Congressional Budget  Office indicated  that seventeen states  directly
taxed food purchases at rates  ranging  from 3 percent  to 6 percent  (Table 3).
While regressive, the  fact  that so  many states have adopted  food excise
taxes also suggests  that  they are  politically feasible.  The most  serious
problem with them is  that  they  fall with unequal burden on  the  poor.
Moreover, tie fact  that  some of  the  poorest states,  such  as  Alabama,
Arkansas and Mississippi, also impost  the highest  food taxes means  that  con-
sumers  there  bear an unequal burden of  general  food  price  increases.  If
food stamp  benefits were allocated more equitably, food stamp  recipients  in
states paying food excise taxes would receive more  federal food  stamps.
A second  factor affecting the distribution  of food stamp benefits  con-
cerns eligibility requirements.  In  1985,  a family was  eligible only if the
asset  value  of  their car was  less  than $4,500,  and  all remaining cash assetsTable  3









New Mexico  3.75
North Carolina  3.00
Oklahoma  3.00
South Carolina  5.00





Source:  Congressional Budget Office-12-
were less  than  $1,500.  These limits,  set  in  1977,  have  lagged  behind  costs
and prices and  tend  to discourage saving in favor  of  consumption.  At  the
same time,  cuts in both food and other assistance  from 1981-85  in
Unemployment Insurance, AFDC, Food  Stamps and Child Nutrition programs  have
made consumption choices  for basic  food needs  increasingly burdensome  for
poor families.  As Table 4 shows, AFDC payments,  food stamps,  and Child
Nutrition programs have all  been cut  over  the period.  Cuts  made in  the  food
stamp program have  included delayed  inflation adjustments and the  elimina-
tion of  households without elderly  or disabled members with incomes  over  130
percent of  the  poverty  line.
These measures  have been especially discouraging  to poor working  fami-
lies whose gross incomes  are  several thousand dollars  over  the poverty line,
but whose net  incomes  are well below it.  In  all,  the  Physician Task Force
(1985, p. 99)  estimated that  for every  100  people  living in poverty in
September, 1980, 68  received  food stamps.  By September,  1984,  only  58  per-
cent were receiving food stamps.  One  of  the  particular ironies  of  the  last
several years  is  that the food stamp  program, designed  in part  as  a demand
enhancing measure, has  been cut  at  the  same  time  that  direct  income  trans-
fers  to  farmers  and farm surpluses have grown ever  larger.
Policy Instruments
The picture  that emerges  from the  previous analysis  provides a striking
perspective on  the failures  of  current policy.  Burgeoning costs  of  farm
programs accompany highly  unstable farm incomes.  Huge  farm surpluses accu-
mulate as  food stamps and  other transfer payments  to  the non-farm poor  fall.
Poverty increases  in both urban and  rural areas.Table 4
Total
Program  1982  1983  1984  1985  1982-85
Unemployment Insurance  -4.0  +10.7  -14.8  -17.6  -6.9
Aid to Families with Dependent
Children  (AFDC)  -9.9  -13.0  -13.5  -14.0  -12.7
Food Stamps  -12.2  -9.7  -14.2  -14.1  -12.6
Child Nutrition  -24.3  -28.8  -29.0  -28.5  -27.7
Women, Infants and Children
Supplemental Program (WIC)  -4.9  +10.5  +7.0  +4.3  +4.4
Source:  Congressional Budget  Office-13-
This  section describes  three proposed instruments  of  reform that  aim  at
the  policy targets identified above.  First,  agricultural  income support
programs should be based, insofar as  possible, on  fixed minimum income
guarantees  linked to a broader program of welfare  reform in the non-farm
sector.  Second-, direct  income  transfers to agriculture should  be  financed
through a national excise  tax on  retail food sales.  Third, compensation to
poor consumers should be paid by increased food stamp eligibility to  indi-
viduals  and increased provision of  food stamp benefits  to  states with
existing sales  taxes on food.  Because of  the  controversial nature  of  the
proposal, each instrument will be investigated separately.
(1)  A Fixed Budget for Agricultural Programs
As  argued above,  the current structure  of  agricultural  programs creates
unpredictable budget  exposure primarily in  the form of deficiency  payments.
Moreover, these deficiency  payments are highly skewed to  the  largest  far-
mers,  because they are  paid on  the  basis of  acres  and volume of  output.  The
fact  that  these entitlements go disproportionately  to the  largest  farmers  is
in itself  cause for concern  on grounds  of  equity, but  it  is  the  size and
unpredictability of  these payments  that dominate  current budget  concerns.
This  budget-exposure could  be both reduced and predicted  if  transfer
payments  to  farmers were based on a minimum income  floor, such  as  the propo-
sal  advocated by Kramer and McDowell.  Because it  is the subject  of  their
paper, it will not  be investigated  in detail here.
By determining the  level of  such an income  floor  for several  years  at  a
time,  yearly marketing decisions  by farmers could  be  taken with  the
knowledge  that a minimum level  of  income security  (and no more)  was
guaranteed.  From the government's  perspective,  budget exposure would be-14-
more predictable.  Of  course,  simply predicting a large  expenditure  in  the
face of  current deficits  is  no solution unless  additional revenues  can be
found, together with incentives  to reduce  these costs  over  time.
(2)  A National Excise Tax on Retail Food Sales
Suppose that income  transfers to  farmers and  food stamps were  financed
through a direct sales  tax on food.  The  logic behind  such a tax  is  simple:
consumers are direct  beneficiaries of  farm and food programs and should be
made directly aware of  their costs.  While many view such a tax as  unattrac-
tive (in part because it  is felt  that  consumers  are better off  not  knowing
these costs) most of  its  objectionable features  can be  dealt with squarely.
These fall  into three categories:  the  size and  cost of  such a tax;  politi-
cal  feasibility;  and  the regressive and unequal  burden of  food excise  taxes.
The size and cost  of a food tax  to  finance agricultural  support  program
and/or food stamps  at  the  levels of  1973-1986  are shown in Table 5.
Personal consumption expenditures  from 1973-1986 for  food and beverages
(excluding alcohol) are shown in the first  column.  In the second  are  farm
income  stabilization costs,  including all expenditures  for  target  prices,
deficiency payments,  crop loans, and other USDA programs other than  food
stamps and nutrition programs.  These are  listed separately  in column three.
Together, these  items  accounted for  an average of  64.4%  of  the USDA budget
over the period.  To obtain present values,  all figures  were discounted by
10-year U.S. Treasury yields  shown in column four, giving adjusted figures
for personal consumption on  food,  farm income  supports,  and food  stamps  and
nutrition assistance.  These adjusted  figures  are  shown in columns  five,  six
and  seven, with total adjusted spending for  income stabilization, food
stamps  and nutrition shown in  column eight.HHH  HHN  NNH  Nl.  N  0
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What these figures  show is  that  if  consumers had  paid a direct  excise
tax on food to support  the  costs  of  income stabilization to  farmers  over  the
period, it would have required  an annual average  retail food  tax of  2.39
percent,  ranging from a low of  less  than one half of  one percent  in  1974  to
a high of  5.79  percent  in  1985  (column nine).  Of  course,  if  costs were  pre-
dictably based on guaranteed income  payments, the  percentage  tax would be
fixed in advance, at whatever  level  the Congress  (as  informed  by consumers)
deemed appropriate.  It is  important  to  emphasize that  if  these costs  had
been borne directly  by  consumers,  rather  than hidden in general  revenues  and
expenditures, taxpayers may have been less willing to  pay them.  If  the
additional burden of food stamps  and nutrition had been added  to  the  price
of  food, the average cost would have been an annual  4.04 percent  retail
excise tax on food (column  ten).  Together, these tax increases  (column
eleven) would have  accounted  for an average  annual retail food tax  of 6.43
percent over the period.  In  1985,  the average  family of  four spent  approxi-
mately  $3,830  on food, implying a monthly tax bill of  $20.52  if  an annual
food excise tax rate  of  6.43  percent had been charged.  It should again  be
emphasized that these  figures are only  the averages  of  past  expenditures.
If  transfers  to agriculture  were  reduced due  to  consumer unwillingness  to
pay  directly for them, excise taxes would  fall accordingly.
Is  such a tax politically feasible?  Although  conventional wisdom says
not,  I believe  that  budget pressures and public  opinion may make  it so.
First, a large part  of  the general public appears willing to  accept higher
taxes, especially  if  they  are targeted  at  increased farm program  spending.
Farm groups, of  course, have traditionally  emphasized  the  low cost  of  food
to U.S.  consumers  in comparison to other Western countries.  While  it  is-16-
often argued that consumers want  still lower  food prices,  and consumer
interest groups often lobby for  them, there  is evidence that  the public  may
be willing to trade  off marginally higher food prices  for greater  stability
in the farm sector.  If food prices  are  linked directly to support  for  farm
income supports via an excise tax on retail food  sales, consumers may be
willing to  pay such taxes.
In a February,  1986 CBS News-New York Times  poll of  1,174 adults,  55
percent  said they would be willing to  pay more  federal  taxes  in  order  to keep
farmers  in business, while 50  percent felt  that  the federal government
should  increase spending on farm income supports.  Only  12  percent  felt  that
such spending should be  decreased, with 30  percent favoring the  same
spending levels and 8 percent holding no  opinion.  Interestingly, support
for  spending increases was  greater in the  general population than in a sub-
sample of  households dependent  on agriculture.  In  a subsample  of  the
agriculturally-dependent  Midwest, only 36  percent  favored  increased farm
program spending, with 14  percent  favoring decreases, 45  percent  the same
levels  and 5 percent holding no opinion.
A separate national  survey commissioned in December 1985  by
Communicatiag for Agriculture, a farm issues education group, asked  specifi-
cally whether respondents would  be willing  to  pay a 1 percent  tax on  their
groceries  to  fund one-year farm income support programs.  Over two-thirds,
or  68  percent, said yes,  25  percent said no,  and 7 percent were undecided.
It  should be noted that  the  poll did not  test  the sensitivity of  the
response to  the size  of  tax proposed or  the  length of  time  over which  it
would be  applied.  A 3 percent  tax over  a longer period,  reflecting the  true
costs  of farm income supports, might elicit  less  enthusiasm.  And a 7 per--17-
cent  tax,  designed  to cover  the  costs  of  food  stamps  and  nutrition  programs,
would  probably  elicit  even  less.  However,  such  poll  results  belie  the  view
that  consumer  support  for  higher  taxes  (and  food  prices)  is  non-existent,
especially if committed to  farm programs and deficit  reduction.
A second reason that  excise  taxes on food appear politically feasible
is  more straightforward:  seventeen states  have passed  them,  including some
of  the poorest states  in the nation.  At  least  on  the surface, there  thus
seems  reason to question whether such taxes  are politically infeasible.  The
principal difficulty is  that those states  that  already  pay such taxes,  and
especially the poor within them, would be  especially burdened by a national
excise  tax on food.  The  regressivity of  such taxes  is  the  third and most
compelling objection to their political  feasibility.  Because  it  is the  most
compelling, it  merits a separate  instrument  of  policy.
(3)  Increasing Food Stamp Eligibility and Welfare Reform
Excise  taxes on food are regressive:  as  a percentage of  income,  food
expenditures weigh more heavily  on  the  poor.  This argument  applies  not  only
to individuals,  but  to states  as well.  Hence,  in poor  states with existing
sales  taxes on food, added  federal taxes will  be  more regressive  at  the
margin than-in states without them.  For reasons  of  equity,  compensation  for
the  regressive  impact of  such  taxes on  the  poor can therefore be  supported
on both on individual and state-by-state basis.  Since the  tax proposed
above  is  on retail food sales,  it  seems  natural  that compensation  be  paid  to
individuals  and states  in  the  form of  expanded eligibility for  food  stamps.
For individuals, expanded eligibility could  result from raising gross  income
eligibility ceilings,  establishing net  (rather than gross)  income require-
ments,  changing asset ownership limitations,  increasing allowances under the-18-
"thrifty food plan,"  or  some combination of  these measures.  For states  with
existing food sales  taxes,  additional food stamps  could be made  available  to
state welfare programs based  on  the percent  state tax.  The advantages  of
such a compensation scheme  are several. 3
First, as  noted above, hunger and  inadequate nutrition are  increasing
problems and would deserve attention whether  or not  the  broader program of
reforms outlined above was  adopted.  Expanded food stamp eligibility,
however, would not  be costless.  If  these  costs were paid  directly by con-
sumers,  they could be added  to  the sales  tax itself.  For this  reason,  food
stamp  and nutrition costs are  explicitly included in  the calculation of
excise taxes  above, although they need  not  be  financed in  this manner.  A
second and offsetting consideration is  that  expanded  food stamp and  nutri-
tion program eligibility would increase consumer demand for surplus  agri-
cultural surpluses.  With current  costs just  to  store  these  surpluses  in
government warehouses running  at approximately  $200 million per year, such
savings would not  be trivial.  Indeed, expansion of  food  stamp and nutrition
programs would reduce  the pressure for a second domestic PIK program, as
well as  additional  export-PIK measures widely blamed for lowering world
market prices.  When  the  costs of  the  1983  PIK program to  the  farm sector
are  reviewed, demand-enhancing measures become  relatively attractive alter-
natives  (see Runge  (ed.),  1986,  pp.  3-56).  Third, because  food stamps  are
It  could be  argued that such a program would encourage states  to  raise
additional  food taxes,  although  the  political costs  of  doing so  would coun- tervail much  of  this  pressure.  In  any case,  setting compensation  in  rela-
tion  to  state food taxes  as  of  1986  would eliminate  this  temptation.  The effect  of  such transfers would be  to reward  those states  for  enacting
measures designed to  tax  consumption, rather  than savings,  a goal with much to  commend it  in macroeconomic terms.-19-
a form of  currency, they are a relatively efficient  basis  for  transferring
income to consumers, who are  then free to  purchase the  market  basket of
goods most consistent with their tastes and  preferences.  It is  well-known
that  the USDA "thrifty  food plan" diet, which depends  in part  on  the
purchase and preparation of  staple items  rather  than more expensive pro-
cessed foods,  is inconsistent with the  demands  on time  of many of  the
nation's poor.  Fourth, from the  public's perspective expanded food-stamp
and nutrition availability would require no new welfare bureaucracy.  The
existing welfare apparatus would be  largely sufficient,  since only  rules of
eligibility would be altered (although an increased number of  recipients
might entail  some additional federal personnel).  Finally, such a program
could be made part of a general reconsideration of  family assistance  as  pro-
posed in the early  1970's  by  the Moynihan Commission, in which income  floors
are  set  by  the government in  both the agricultural and non-agricultural  sec-
tor, reducing both the complexity and disincentives  of  current welfare
programs  (Moynihan, 1973).
Conclusion
A three-part set  of  reforms  has  been proposed:  (1) a fixed budget  for
agricultural programs  based on a minimum income  floor in  the  agricultural
(and possibly the non-agricultural) sector;  (2) a national excise tax on
retail food sales;  (3) increasing food stamp eligibility and welfare  reform.
These reforms  are  directed at  three targets:  (1)  budget  exposure in agri-
cultural program spending;  (2) income  instability in  the agricultural
sector;  (3)  hunger and inadequate nutrition.
Naturally,  the complexity of  such  changes is  greater than simply
matching  these targest  and instruments.  However, current  budget imbalances,-20-
combined with a crisis  in agricultural program spending and growing evidence
of  hunger and inadequate nutrition, demand both attention  ann innovation.
While the innovations above would not  be costless,  the incentives created
are  not  in  the direction of  greater government  spending.  First,  by linking
agricultural program spending directly  to  food prices,  consumers would be
made aware of  the costs  of  these  transfers.  Whether they would  be  willing
to  pay them is  an open question, most appropriately determined by  the
Congress  as  informed by  consumer  opinion.  Within reason,  poll data suggests
that consumers would be willing  to  pay for income  security in  the  farm sec-
tor.  Second, the proposals  are aimed directly  at  reductions  in the  budget
exposure of agricultural  programs, as  well as  the unpredictability  of  these
expenditures.  On both grounds,  they are fiscally prudent  and essentially
conservative.  Finally, although expanded welfare assistance is  often asso-
ciated with "big-government," expanded food  stamp and  nutrition programs  may
actually  be more efficient and less  costly  in the  face of  food  surpluses
than alternatives such as Payments-in-Kind.  When based  on a guaranteed
income floor, such  transfers  also are  an appealing alternative to  the
current  system of welfare.
In  all, these proposals suggest  the  close  linkage between agricultural
programs, budget  constraints, and  income  levels  determining human health and
nutrition.  A new structure  for U.S.  food and  agricultural policy must
recognize these  connections to  be  economically rational and  politically
feasible.-21-
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